Brussels – Among the candidate countries for European Union membership, three currently seem rather far away. They are Georgia, Serbia, and Turkey. Each of them has various critical issues on different levels. However, one thing that Tbilisi, Belgrade, and Ankara have in common is their disconnection from Brussels on one key issue: foreign and security policy, which, since the aggression of Ukraine two and a half years ago, includes the imperative to not align with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Serbia, Achilles’ heel of the Balkans
Of the six candidate countries in the Balkan region, Serbia (which applied for membership in 2012) is definitely the most problematic in terms of misalignment with the strategic priorities of EU foreign policy. In its annual report on the progress of the accession process (also called the enlargement package), presented Wednesday (Oct. 30) by the High Representative for Foreign Policy Josep Borrell and Enlargement and Neighborhood Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi, states: “The pace of negotiations” for Belgrade’s entry into the European club “will continue to depend on reforms on the rule of law and the normalization of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo.”
Regarding the first point, the reforms on which the Balkan country needs to focus mainly on the freedom of civil society and the media and the fight against disinformation and interference from abroad. Translated: it must reduce exposure to the Kremlin’s hybrid campaigns, which grip this state more than others in the region.
However, the complex relationship with Kosovo is the main point influencing Serbia’s European prospects. Belgrade has never recognized Pristina‘s independence (proclaimed unilaterally in 2008 and recognized by more than half of UN member states), and the dialogue between the two nations – facilitated by the EU – is not making significant progress, an understatement, given the moments of acute crisis in recent times (e.g., the dispute over Albanian license plates that later resulted in the bloody episode at the Banjska Monastery in September 2023). For that matter, the Serbian government led by Miloš Vučević reiterated that it intends to continue on the line of non-recognition of what it considers a part of the national territory.
A parallel concern for Brussels is Belgrade’s closeness to Moscow, another issue for Vučević’s executive (but also previous ones), which includes two politicians sanctioned by the United States for their ties to Vladimir Putin’s Russia: former intelligence chief Aleksandar Vulin and businessman Nenand Popović. The EU executive underlines that Serbia “has not yet aligned with the restrictive measures” adopted by the EU “against the Russian Federation” and other countries such as Belarus, North Korea, and Iran and “has not aligned with most of the statements of the High Representative” directed at the Kremlin. In addition to this, Belgrade “maintained high-level relations” with Moscow and “intensified” those with Beijing, “raising doubts about Serbia’s strategic direction,” the report continued.
Georgia, a country in the balance
Another candidate state that is dangerously leaning toward Moscow is Georgia. Although its population is strongly pro-Western, the government – since 2012 firmly in the hands of Georgian Dream, the party of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili – has over the past year increasingly taken pro-Russian positions, forcing, moreover, the parliamentary passage of two repressive measures (a law on “foreign agents” and one on the family that discriminates against members of the LGBTQ+ community) modeled along the example of similar Russian legislation, which prompted the freezing of Tbilisi EU rapprochement path (launched in 2022) and the suspension of disbursement of EU funds.
The situation did not improved with the last round of elections on Saturday (Oct. 26), during which local and international observers reported a long series of irregularities and violations and which the opposition parties have pledged not to acknowledge, refusing to take office in the new parliament. According to the President of the Republic, Salomé Zourabichvili, the elections were “stolen” from Georgians by “a Russian intelligence operation,” and even in Brussels, there are fears that the outcome of the vote could push the small Caucasian state towards Moscow’s orbit in an irreparable way.
According to the European Commission’s analysis, “the rate of alignment with EU foreign and security policy remains considerably low,” even though Tbilisi has “cooperated with the EU to prevent the circumvention of sanctions” imposed on the Russian Federation. However, this cooperation may come to an end shortly.
The eternal limbo of Turkey
Turkey’s hopes of joining the EU also remain decidedly slim: the Anatolian country applied for membership back in 1999 but, for a long series of reasons, has never had a concrete prospect of joining the 12-star club, and now its file has been stalled since 2018. Among the most significant obstacles are the Cypriot question, disputes with Greece over control of certain sea stretches (and underlying hydrocarbon deposits) in the eastern Mediterranean, respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights (including those of minorities and women), and, again, the disconnect in foreign policy between Ankara and Brussels.
Under the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has moved relatively casually (critics would say recklessly) on the international stage, establishing an ambivalent relationship with Putin’s Russia. On some crisis fronts, such as the Syrian one, the two leaders have found themselves on opposing sides. However, the two countries are closely linked by a growing relationship that spans the political plane (Ankara is reportedly aspiring to join the BRICS, which the Moscow strongman calls the global alternative to the West), strategic (from Africa to Ukraine via the Caucasus), economic (with increasing trade flows), and energy (Turkey appears to be aiming to become the hub for bringing Russian gas into Europe at a time when sanctions prevent EU states from sourcing directly from the Federation).
The EU executive reiterates that Ankara “has refused to align itself with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia regarding Russia’s aggression of Ukraine” and suggests that Turkey should step up efforts to reduce sanction circumvention of goods bound for the Federation by preventing the “false transit” of high priority items through its territory. The Anatolian Republic should also “cooperate more actively with EU investigating authorities on cases of falsification of origin of sanctioned goods from Russia illegally entering the single market” of the 27 member states. In Borrell’s words, the alignment between EU and Turkish foreign policy is “particularly low and declining.”
English version by the Translation Service of Withub
