Brussels–A new survey released today by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) finds that despite events such as the delay in aid to Ukraine by the United States, the shift toward far-right populist parties in Europe, and the recent intensification of Russian military strikes in Ukraine, there is no visible collapse in morale in Ukraine nor a change in support for the Ukrainian war effort among European allies.
The ECFR study, The meaning of sovereignty: Ukrainian and European views of Russia’s war on Ukraine, is based on surveys conducted by Datapraxis with YouGov, Norstat, Alpha Research, and Rating Group in 15 countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine). It reveals that while Ukrainians believe they can win against Russia, Europeans are more likely to say the solution to the war will be negotiations, such as 43 percent of respondents in Italy. This view is most prevalent among EU member states such as Britain, Poland, and Sweden, the most staunch supporters of Ukraine. The survey shows an overwhelming consensus in the EU against sending European troops to support Ukraine.
The report’s authors, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, believe that these divergences between Ukraine and its European allies could pose significant challenges for world leaders ahead of meetings at the 75th annual NATO summit next week in Washington, D.C. They also argue that Kyiv’s reluctance to compromise, already taken for granted by Europeans, could make Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO difficult.
The most important results of the latest ECFR survey
In Europe, there is strong support for allies to increase the supply of arms and ammunition to Ukraine. Support is most pronounced among respondents in Estonia (where 74% consider increasing ammunition and weapons a “good idea”), Sweden (66%), Poland (66%), Britain (59%), the Netherlands (58%), and Portugal (57%). Support is also strong in Spain (45%), Germany (44%), France (43%), and the Czech Republic (43%). Of the 15 countries polled, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy were the only ones with a majority that bucked the trend (63%, 54%, and 53%, respectively), seeing an increase in the supply of ammunition and weapons to Ukraine as a “bad idea.”
Most Europeans do not favor an increase in defense costs despite the war in Ukraine. Only in Poland (53 percent), Estonia (45 percent), Sweden (41 percent), and Germany (40 percent) is there a high percentage of public support for increased spending on national defense, “even if it means [having to] cut funds in other areas such as healthcare, education, and crime prevention.” But in most other countries, the prevailing opinion (in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Switzerland, the majority) is against increasing defense costs despite the war.
Europeans are against sending troops to Ukraine. This opinion is widespread even in the most “warlike” countries. In every country surveyed, a majority of the population (ranging from 54 percent in Sweden to 90 percent in Bulgaria) opposes the commitment of troops. In Italy, an 80% majority opposes sending troops to Ukraine. However, Europeans are still inclined to approve the involvement of national troops in the war in different ways, such as providing technical assistance to the Ukrainian army or patrolling the border between Ukraine and Belarus.
European countries have three types of attitudes toward the war: those who want Ukraine to defeat Russia (the “justice camp”), those who want the war to end as soon as possible (the “peace camp”), and those in the middle (the “swing states”). Respondents in Estonia (68 percent), Sweden (54 percent), Poland (50 percent), Britain (46 percent), and Portugal (42 percent) say that “Europe should support Ukraine in fighting the territories occupied by Russia.” Respondents who believe that “Europe should push Ukraine to negotiate a peace agreement with Russia” are most numerous in Bulgaria (61%), Greece (59%), and Italy (57%). Europe’s “swing states” are France (30% in favor of war, 36% in favor of a peace agreement), Spain (32% vs. 31%), the Netherlands (36% vs. 31%), Germany (31% vs. 41%), Switzerland (29% vs. 42%) and the Czech Republic (34% vs. 46%).
Europeans are skeptical about Kyiv’s ability to defeat Russia. A large number of respondents believe that the war between Russia and Ukraine will end in negotiations, especially in Greece (49%), Italy (48%), Bulgaria (46%), and Spain (45%). Only Estonia has a high percentage of respondents (38%) who believe Ukraine will win the war. However, European expectations of a Ukrainian victory increase by an average of 12 percentage points if the country receives an increased supply of arms and ammunition from the allies. However, in 11 of the 15 countries, the majority believe that the most likely outcome will be negotiations. In Italy, 18% of respondents believe the war in Ukraine will end “within the next year.” 22% of Italians believe “Russia will win the war,” while 3% believe Ukraine can win on the battlefield.
Ukrainians believe they can defeat Russia and continue to count on the support of international allies. Only one percent of Ukrainians believe Russia will win the war, while the majority (58%) believe Ukraine will win. Less than a third (30%) believe the most likely outcome will be negotiations. In the event of an increased supply of arms and ammunition from the allies, the percentage of those who believe Ukraine will win increases to 69%. Resilience and security are also evident in the trust Ukrainians have in their allies, with 72% rating the EU as a reliable ally. This trust peaks at 84% towards the United Kingdom and also appears very strong towards the United States (78%) and Lithuania (77%). Finally, 76% and 73% of Ukrainians consider Germany and France, respectively, to be reliable allies, despite the fact that the support of these two nations was very uncertain in the early months of the war.
However, Ukraine appears divided regarding possible compromises that could end the conflict. When presented with a hypothetical compromise between NATO membership and territorial integrity, more than seven out of ten Ukrainians (71%) said they would oppose NATO membership in exchange for ceding Russian-occupied territory. In a second scenario presented to respondents, 45% said they would prefer to lose parts of the currently occupied territory but remain sovereign, “with their own army and the freedom to choose their own alliances, such as the EU and NATO.” Only 26% said they would prefer to regain the currently occupied territory but, in return, accept demilitarization and become a neutral country that could not join alliances such as the EU and NATO. The remaining 29 percent could not give an answer.
Trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the country’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is strong. 79% of Ukrainians said they had “a lot of trust” in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with a further 17% saying they had “very much trust.” Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) said they had “a lot of confidence” or “very much confidence” in the country’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, despite the struggles on the battlefield and the duties dictated by his role.
Russia’s military strength is seen as the main obstacle to Ukrainian success, both by Ukrainians and most Europeans. The view that Russia’s military strength is a “major” or “moderate” obstacle to Ukraine’s claim to territory is most prevalent in Ukraine (81%), Greece and Estonia (79%), Bulgaria (76%), the Czech Republic (74%), Poland (73%), Britain (72%), and Spain (71%). Sweden is an exception, in fact only 56% believe that Russian military force is a major obstacle to Ukraine’s claim to territory. In Italy, 64% think Russia’s military strength is a “moderate” or “major” obstacle. Italians are also pessimistic about the likelihood of “major political change” in Russia within the next two years: 25% consider it “likely,” while 53% consider it “unlikely.”
Europeans are divided on the benefits of Ukraine’s admission to the EU. The ECFR survey finds strong support for Ukrainian EU membership in Portugal (59% believe membership is a “good idea,” while 20% a “bad idea”), Estonia (58% vs. 27%), Sweden (53% vs. 28%), Spain (51% vs. 24%) and Poland (48% vs. 31%). Skepticism is more prevalent in Germany (54% say it is a “bad idea” while 31% a “good idea”), Bulgaria (50% vs. 26%), Czech Republic (48% vs. 36%) and France (40% vs. 36%). Among Ukrainians themselves, almost two-thirds (64%) believe that EU membership is as crucial to their country’s future as NATO membership.
Ivan Krastev, co-author and President of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia said, commenting on the survey data, “The surprising thing about public opinion toward Ukraine is its stability: while the conflict has not frozen, in many respects, the attitudes of citizens have.”
Mark Leonard, co-author and Founding Director of ECFR, added: “Our new survey suggests that one of the key challenges for Western leaders will be to reconcile the conflicting positions between Europeans and Ukrainians on ending the war. While both recognize the need for continued Western military supply to continue to repel Russian aggression, there is a deep divide over what a victory actually is and what the purpose of Europe’s support actually is.”
According to Leonard, “while Europeans believe that the most likely outcome of the war will be negotiations, the Ukrainians are not yet ready to consider territorial compromises for NATO membership, nor to engage with the idea of ‘Finlandization,’ by which they would retain territory but give up their EU and NATO ambitions.”
English version by the Translation Service of Withub
