Brussels – By September 20, each member state must notify Brussels of its medium-term recovery plan for government deficit: This is what the reform of the Stability Pact already provides for after the final green light from the EU Council. However, the new rules provide a broader and more packed timetable, ensuring that politics, including the Italian one, will not go on vacation. The recovery plan will have to be drawn up based on guidance from the Commission, which will notify each government on June 21 of its respective debt reduction path.
Net spending reduction is the benchmark the EU executive will look at with unyielding attention. If these trajectories are not adhered to, debt-related excessive deficit procedures can be initiated. In any case, the public accounts adjustment reference trajectories that the Commission will indicate on June 21 will initially be confidential and, therefore, not made public. This is because soon after, during the summer, the technical dialogue between the Commission itself and the member states will begin—a negotiation functional to drafting the debt repayment plans expected by September 20 at the latest.
In the fall, when the European semester package containing country-specific recommendations is adopted, the community executive will publish the assessments of these recovery plans. On this occasion, the debt reduction trajectories will become public because they will be official. In the event of a negative evaluation, the government will be asked to submit an updated and revised version of the strategy, to be implemented strictly from January 1, 2025. From then on, each year, by April 30 at the latest, they will have to submit annual reports on the progress made regarding reforms and debt reduction measures.
There is no shortage of things to do. The new stability pact will not send national governments on vacation. This is especially true for Meloni’s executive. For a country like Italy, with the second-highest public debt to GDP ratio after Greece, the efforts required will be many, and the clashes few. Because, they clarify in Brussels, to disregard defence spending, which in any case remains a relevant factor in the calculation of macroeconomic imbalances, at least the deficit-to-GDP ratio must be brought back within the 3 per cent threshold, which is not the case at the moment.
English version by the Translation Service of Withub