Brussels – A step forward could mark a first turning point for relations between Serbia and Kosovo in 2024, after a year that had opened under the best auspices but then turned out to be one of the most difficult since Pristina unilaterally declared independence from Belgrade in 2008. “The European Union welcomes the decision to formally recognize the RKS license plates issued by Kosovo,” is the comment from European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesman, Peter Stano, a day after Belgrade’s (partial) concession to the easing of tension with Pristina over what has been dubbed the “fight over licence plates” since 2021.
It was in 2011 that Serbia and Kosovo first agreed to recognize each other’s license plates, thanks to an agreement brokered by the EU during the first year of the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue to normalize relations. However, the decision was never fully implemented and to date, vehicles from Kosovo into Serbia and vice versa can only cross the border if they affix vignettes to cover their respective national symbols. As of September 2021, vehicle licence plates have become the (first) breaking point for relations between the Kosovo government of Albin Kurti and Belgrade strongman President Aleksandar Vučić, with the epicenter of tension in northern Kosovo inhabited by a sizeable ethnic Serb minority.
On Monday (Dec. 25), the head of the Serbian government office for Kosovo, Petar Petković, confirmed that from Jan. 1, 2024, all vehicles with licence plates from the Republic of Kosovo will be able to freely cross the border with Serbia. “This is a positive step in the implementation of the Agreement on the normalization path and past commitments made in the framework of the dialogue on freedom of movement,” the EEAS spokesman stressed with satisfaction, reiterating that this decision “shows that it is possible to make progress” in the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue and that “it is also a step in the right direction towards better regional and Western Balkan integration, for the benefit of citizens.” For this reason, the EU urges Kosovo to “respond similarly,” Stano warned. However, Belgrade’s decision should not be overstated politically, also given the announcement by the resigning government of Ana Brnabić on the non-recognition, not even de facto, of Kosovo’s sovereignty. Petković explained that a disclaimer will be posted at border and administrative crossings and “this cannot be interpreted as a recognition of Kosovo’s independence.”
From the fight over licence plates to the attack in northern Kosovo
After the two 2021 summer meetings between PM Kurti and President Vučić in Brussels, the so-called fight over license plates broke out for the first time in northern Kosovo in mid-September of that year. Initially, it was a diplomatic dispute between Pristina and Belgrade, related to the Kurti government’s decision to impose the change of licence plates on Serbian vehicles entering Kosovo territory, used largely by the very Serbian minority in the country. The issue was momentarily resolved thanks to the EU mediation, but the absence of a final solution inflamed the second half of 2022: in late July the first roadblocks and barricades by the most extremist fringes of the Serb-Kosovar minority appeared, and two failed meetings between Vučić and Kurti in Brussels led to no breakthrough of the stalemate.
The situation worsened when Lista Sprska took over the reins of popular protest in northern Kosovo. On November 5, mass resignations of mayors, councilors, parliamentarians, judges, prosecutors, judicial personnel, and police officers from their respective national institutions were staged in protest against the phased plan for implementation of Serbian licence plate replacement rules. Among those resigning were the mayors of Kosovska Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvecan, and Leposavić, and because of this, it became necessary to return to the polls in the four cities: originally scheduled for December 18, voting was later postponed to April 23. At the same time, a compromise solution on the plates was reached on the night of November 23-24 in Brussels, although, before the EU-Western Balkans summit on December 6 in Tirana, Serbian President Vučić threatened to boycott it because of the appointment of Nenad Rašić within the Kosovo government (instead of the leader of Lista Srpska, Goran Rakić), as minister for Communities and Refugee Return. Rašić is the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, a Serbian formation hostile to Belgrade and a competitor of Lista Srpska.
The year 2022 ended with a new escalation of tension at border crossings in northern Kosovo after Pristina decided to send several hundred police to make up for the resigned officers also in November. The barricades of the most extremist Serb-Kosovar fringes were dismantled only after a few weeks thanks to the diplomatic effort of European and U.S. partners. The new crisis had to wait only five months, more precisely May 26, 2023. Due to the taking office of the newly elected mayors of Zubin Potok, Zvečan, Leposavić, and Kosovska Mitrovica, violent protests broke out with the responsibility of Lista Srpska exponents. The protests turned into guerrilla warfare on May 29 also involving soldiers from the international Kfor mission led by NATO (30 were wounded, including 11 Italians). Tensions deflagrated over the Kurti government’s decision to force its hand and bring in special police forces to allow into town halls the mayors elected on April 23 in a controversial election round: turnout tended to be derisory—around 3 percent—precisely because of Lista Srpska’s boycott.
After the deployment in the Balkan country of 700 additional members of the Kfor reserve contingent, new protests erupted in early June over the arrest of two protesters accused of being among those responsible for the violence in late May. At the same time, an arrest/kidnapping of three Kosovar policemen by Serbian security services was staged on June 14; the governments of Pristina and Belgrade accused each other of trespassing by their respective law enforcement agencies in a border area between northern Kosovo and southern Serbia that is poorly controlled by Kosovar police and usually used by smugglers trying to avoid border controls. After weeks of unheeded continued calls for calm and de-escalation, Brussels found it necessary to convene an emergency meeting with PM Kurti and President Vučić to seek viable ways to back out of “crisis management mode.” On June 22 came Serbia’s discharge of the three Kosovar policemen, but the issue of tensions between Pristina and Belgrade also ended up in the conclusions of the June 29-30 European Council.
Due to Pristina’s failure to take a “constructive attitude” toward de-escalation of tension, Brussels imposed “temporary and reversible” measures against Kosovo in late June, which also included suspending the work of the bodies of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. A roadmap with four stages was agreed on July 12 to remove these measures, but they are still in place (as criticized by the Kosovar president, Vjosa Osmani, at the last EU-Western Balkans summit). Within days of an unsuccessful high-level meeting in Brussels, however, the situation between Serbia and Kosovo escalated with the terrorist attack that began in the early hours of Sept. 24 near the Serbian Orthodox monastery in Banjska, when Kosovar police arrived to reports of an illegal checkpoint on the border with Serbia. The officers were attacked from several positions by a group of about 30 men armed with a large arsenal who, after killing one policeman and wounding two others, entered the monastic complex where pilgrims from the Serbian city of Novi Sad were staying. Clashes continued throughout the day during the “clearing operation,” in which three of the terrorists died.
Post-September 24 developments, however, have painted a much more serious picture than expected, with obvious ramifications in neighboring Serbia. As highlighted by a video filmed by a drone on the day of the attack, among the attackers outside the monastery was Radoičić, deputy head of Lista Srpska. While Kosovar police discovered a huge arsenal of weapons and equipment at the terrorists’ disposal, on Friday (Sept. 29) Radoičić himself confirmed that he had led the armed attack, putting the Serb leader on the spot. This confession has cast a long shadow not only
on
the Serb-Kosovar leadership’s participation in a potentially years-long
destabilization strategy but more importantly over Vučić’s ability to interfere in Pristina’s internal affairs in a more or less covert and violent manner. Adding to this are revelations about the presence also of Bojan Mijailović (one of the three killed bombers), a bodyguard of the head of the Serbian intelligence service, Aleksandar Vulin, and especially of Milorad Jevtić, a close associate of the Serbian president’s son, Danilo Vučić. According to the findings of an investigation by Balkan Insight, the weapons used in the attack had been manufactured in Serbia in 2022 and some mortar shells and grenades had been repaired in Serbian state maintenance centers in 2018 and 2021.
The US warning of a Serbian “large military
deployment” along the administrative border with “an unprecedented
build-up of advanced artillery, tanks, and mechanized infantry units”
finally soured relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The threat did not materialize—according to PM Kurti, an annexation of northern Kosovo was planned with “a coordinated attack on 37 separate positions”—but the European Union has begun to reflect on the possibility of imposing against Belgrade the same measures in force against Pristina. “We need to make sure that we make the best use of the tools the EU has to encourage both sides to contribute to a solution of the crisis,” EEAS spokesman Peter Stano had explained to Eunews. But the green light for the “temporary and reversible” measures against Serbia requires unanimity in the Council and at the moment the only veto was placed by Vučić’s closest ally inside the Union: Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, who calls the scenario outlined by European officials and shared by the other 26 governments “absurd and ridiculous.”
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